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INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, many states have substantially revised their general
business corporation statutes. This development has reflected a realization that
previously existing statutes were unsuited to the requirements of the modern corpora-
tion and, because they were unsuitable, had induced businessmen to incorporate else-
where and to do business as a foreign corporation in the state which, except for its
obsolete laws, should have been the situs of incorporation.2
The manner in which these revisions have been effected has depended primarily
upon the starting point taken by the committee assigned to the task in the particular
state. All but two of the nine corporation statutes which have been revised since
i95o have been patterned after the Model Business Corporation Act prepared by
the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association.8 The Mary-
land revision was based upon many sources, particularly its existing corporation
statutes, but also the statutes of other states and the Model Act. The Ohio revision
was based primarily upon the earlier corporation statutes of that state. Other states
that are considering revision of their corporation statutes, however, appear to be
inclining to the Model Act.4
Section fourteen of the Model Act provides that authorized shares may be divided
into one or more classes and permits great latitude with respect to such share
characteristics as voting, par value, preferences on liquidation, dividends, redemption
of shares, convertibility, and pre-emptive rights. Each of the new statutes which has
*A.B. 1939, Harvard University; LL.B. 1948, University of Virginia. Member of the New York bar.
'See Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAmtoR L. REV. 412, 416 (1952), for a list of the
statutes revised during the years 1927-51. Since 195o, the following states have adopted revised general
business corporation statutes: District of Columbia (1954), Maryland (1951), North Carolina (x955),
North Dakota (1957), Ohio (1955), Oregon (1953), Texas (955), Virginia (1956), and Wisconsin
('95').
'The North Carolina Business Corporation Act, as proposed to the Legislature, contained a provision
intended to prevent avoidance of its corporation statutes by making their provisions applicable to pseudo-
foreign corporations doing business in North Carolina. A pseudo-foreign corporation was defined as
" . . a foreign corporation which .. . obtains . . .a certificate of authority to transact business in this
State and which engages in no substantial business activity in the state or country of its incorporation,
and which, by virtue of the place and character of its business and personnel, is more closely identified
with the business life of this State than with that of any other state or country .. " N.C. S.B. No.
49, § 5-1) (1955). Because of the vagueness of its language as well as its novelty, the Legislature
omitted this provision in adopting the Act. See Powers, Drafting a Corporation Code for North Carolina,
1o ARx. L. Rav. 37, 44 (1955)-
'The Model Business Corporation Act was first widely-publicized in Business Lawyer, Nov. x95o, No.
x. It has since been published as a handbook by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
American Law Institute in its 1950 form, and, with revisions, it has been republished in 1953 and 1955.
' See Garrett, supra note i, at 425.
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followed the Model Act has directly adopted section fourteen; 5 and those which have
not, contain a comparable provision which affords similar leeway with respect to
share characteristics.6 This article will proceed to examine the new statutory pro-
visions relating to the more important share characteristics.
I
VOTNG
A. Generally
Under the Model Act, each outstanding share of stock is entitled to one vote on
each matter submitted to a vote at a meeting of the shareholders, but voting rights
may be limited or denied to any class by the articles of incorporation to the extent
not prohibited by the Act.7 Under that Act, the matters as to which voting rights
cannot thus be limited or denied are mergers or consolidations;' sales, leases, mort-
gages, and other dispositions of all or substantially all assets not in the regular couise
of business;) voluntary dissolution;10 revocation of voluntary dissolution proceed-
ings; 11 and amendments to the articles of incorporation substantially affecting the
shares of any class.' 2 On all of these important matters, corporate action prerequires
a two-thirds vote of all issues and outstanding shares. And in the case of an amend-
ment to the articles of incorporation'3 or a merger or consolidation' 4 substantially
affecting the shares of a class, a two-thirds vote of that class is also required. -
The pattern of the Model Act with respect to voting rights has been followed
in each of the jurisdictions which has based its revised corporation statute thereon,
but in all cases, there has been some variation. Many of these new statutes differ
from the Model Act with respect to the percentage of vote required for various
corporate actions.
The Texas statute requires' 5 a four-fifths vote for all action requiring a two-
thirds vote under the Model Act,'6 except amendments to the articles of incorpora-
tion, which require a two-thirds vote, 7 and mortgages and pledges of assets not in
the regular course of business, which may be authorized by action of the board of
directors.' 8 Although Texas, in adopting this requirement, has merely adhered to
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-9o8 (Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-40 (Supp. 1955); N.D. Laws 1957,
c. 102, § 12; ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.080 (Supp. 1955); Thx. Bus. Coap. ACT, art. 2.12 (1956); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-12, 13.r-13 (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT. § x8o.r2 (1955).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.o6 (Page Supp. 1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 14 (1951).
7MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRAroN ACT §§ 14, 31.
BId. § 67. 'Id. § 73-
'Id. § 77. 'ld. § 82.
"Id. § 53- "Id. § 55.
"Id. § 67.
"For the Texas provision as to voting generally, see Tax. Bus. Cos,. AT art. 2.29 (1956).
"id. art. 5.03 (as to merger or consolidation), id. art. 5.10 (as to sales, leases, exchanges, and
other dispositions, other than mortgages and pledges, of all or substantially all assets), id. art. 6.o3,
6.o8 (as to dissolution and revocation of dissolution).
17 Id. arts. 4.02, 4.03.
" Id. art. 5.10, as amended, Tex. Acts 1957, c. 54, § 9. As originally adopted, this provision re-
quired an eighty per cent shareholder vote for mortgages, but this was found to be too burdensome and
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its prior statutory standard, such a high percentage vote would appear to be un-
necessarily strict and unduly burdensome. Stockholder inertia alone in a publicly-
held corporation might suffice to prevent corporate action which requires an eighty
per cent affirmative vote. If it were considered desirable to retain the eighty-per-cent-
approval requirement for important action, it might have been preferable to have
prerequired only a two-thirds vote, while giving a veto power to votes of twenty per
cent cast in opposition. At least this would have put the burden on the opposition.
Since dissenters' rights are available in each case where the eighty per cent vote is re-
quired, however, even such a veto power is probably unnecessary, as the potential
cash drain from dissents would in most cases serve as an effectual deterrent to an un-
popular plan.
North Carolina, adhering to its pre-existing statutory standard, has reduced to a
majority the vote required for a merger or consolidation" or an amendment of the
articles of incorporation2 This reduction can be justified on the theory that the
availability of dissenters' rights in these situations affords adequate protection to
those shareholders who may feel themselves prejudiced thereby. In any case, it
would seem to make little difference whether the vote requirement is two-thirds or
a majority, as experience indicates that plans seldom fail because of inability to
muster the statutory minimum. The real limiting factor is rather the threat to
working capital posed by dissenters' rights of appraisal.
The District of Columbia statute has departed from the Model Act provision
by requiring a class vote for a merger, whether or not the merger would effect a
substantial change in the securities of such class.' This is the antithesis of the
philosophy embodied in the New York"2 and Delaware23 statutes, which do not even
require a class vote where the rights of a class of shares would be substantially
affected by the merger or consolidation. These latter statutes rather rely on dis-
senters' rights to guarantee adequate protection against changes adversely affecting
a particular class.
In certain states, the requirement that all shareholders be granted a vote on a
particular action has been changed to specify that only those shareholders entitled
to vote under the articles of incorporation may vote. In Wisconsin 24 and the Dis-
trict of Columbia,25 this has been done with respect to sales, mortgages, and pledges
of all assets in other than the regular course of business. Under the Ohio statute,
only shareholders entitled to vote under the articles of incorporation may vote with
regard to amendments, mergers or consolidations, sales of assets, and dissolution2
In the same vein, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia have eliminated the require-
was changed by amendment in the 1957 legislative session to its present form. See Carrington, Experi-
ence in Texas with the Model Business Corporation Act, 5 UTAH L. REV. 292, 302 (x957).
10N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-107 (Supp. 1955). "Id. § 55-05.
2"D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-927c (Supp. 1956). "N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 5I, 86.
"2DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1953). "W.Vis. STAT. § 180.7I (1955).
"rD.C. CODE ANN. § 29-928 (Supp. x956).
8 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 17oz.o6, 1701.71, 1701.76, 1701.79, 1701.86 (Page Supp. 1956).
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ment of a shareholder vote in connection with mortgages or pledges of assets.2
Since the board of directors, without shareholder action, can create other indebted-
ness, which, upon a default and prosecution to judgment may become a lien on the
corporation's assets, there would not appear to be any real reason for otherwise in-
hibiting the execution of a direct mortgage or pledge of assets to secure such indebted-
ness.
2 8
Several of the new statutes have added dissenters' rights with respect to matters
where dissenters are not accorded such rights under the Model Act. The Model
Act provides for the right of dissent only in connection with mergers, consolida-
tions, and sales or exchanges of assets 9 The North Carolina statute, however, has
added dissenters' rights with respect to amendments to the certificate of incorpora-
tion which substantially affect a class of equity securities which is preferred as to
dividends or on liquidation.30 And the Ohio statute has a substantially identical
provisionY' But in so providing, these statutes impair a corporation's ability to
reclassify its shares when such action is desirable or even necessary for purposes of
reorganization. Thus, if a corporation seeks to reorganize by reclassifying a pre-
ferred class of its equity securities, the availability of dissenters' rights might con-
stitute such a cash-drain potential as to prevent, as a practical matter, the effectuation
of the plan.
In eliminating the right afforded by section fifty-three of the Model Act, by
amendment to the articles of incorporation to cancel or otherwise affect the right
of holders of shares to receive cumulative dividends which have accrued but have
not been declared, the District of Columbia statute may raise a similar problem 2
During the i93o's, many corporations sought to eliminate accrued dividend arrear-
ages in this manner. 3 Since the existing statutes did not specifically authorize this
technique, the courts held, in a number of instances, that such accrued undeclared
dividends were vested rights and could not be so divested 4 Consequently, they
declared void reorganization plans which sought to reclassify shares to eliminate
accrued dividends or to capitalize them by the issuance of shares in return therefor.
To circumvent this obstacle, corporations subsequently resorted to mergers with
wholly-owned subsidiaries, a technique that was sanctioned by the courtsO5 Statu-
tory provisions permitting amendment of the articles of incorporation to reclassify
2'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112 (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACr art. 5.09 (1956); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.x-77 (Supp. 1956).
"s See Carrington, supra note i8, at 304.
"
0 MODEL BusINEss CoRPoRAsoN ACr §§ 71, 74.
30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10 (Supp. 1955).
3' Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.74 (Page Supp. 1956).
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 29 -9 2If (Supp. x956).
"See Barnhart, Recent Trends in Corporation Legislation, io Amu. L. Rev. 12, 22 (1955).
"E.g., Keller v. Wilson, 21 Del. Ch. 391, x9o At. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Film Industries v.
Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 At. 489 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Contra, McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184
Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
'
5 Havender v. Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 318, i A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Holtenstein v.
York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3 d Cir. 1943).
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shares in order to eliminate accrued dividend arrearages,38 however, obviate this
problem; but any plan of reorganization involving the elimination of such arrearages
must be fair and equitable, 7 giving an equivalent in return therefor. Failure to
adopt the portion of section fifty-three of the Model Act permitting such elimination
of arrearages, will therefore, resurrect the problem which the Model Act had sought
to cure.
The original draft of the Model Act, patterned after the Illinois statute,88 pro-
vided that each share of stock was entitled to one vote in all matters, and the right
to vote was subject to abridgment only in the case of junior stocks where preferred
dividends were in arrears09 It was felt, however, that the Illinois statutory provision
was unnecessarily stringent. Thus, it would have prevented the issuance of non-
voting preferred stocks, a fairly traditional security, and, it would have deprived
the corporation of flexibility in other situations where equity financing without dis-
turbing control is the object. For example, in the recent trend toward restricted
stock option plans, closely-held corporations have sought to grant to officers and key
employees the tax benefits of restricted stock option plans, without giving them a
voting security. This has been done through the issuance of options on nonvoting
shares. A strict statutory provision as to voting rights, such as that of Illinois, would
not have permitted this. Accordingly, the Model Act was altered to its present form
in 1953.
The Model Act provision restricting mandatory voting to important matters has
been a real step forward in providing both flexibility and sufficient shareholder safe-
guards. The new statutes patterned after the Model Act apparently have found
its general provisions sufficiently palatable to warrant substantial adoption. Except
for the adherence by Texas to its sui generis high vote requirement, the inclusion of
dissenters' rights upon amendments of the articles of incorporation by North Caro-
lina, and the omission by the District of Columbia of the right to amend the articles
of incorporation by a two-thirds vote to eliminate accrued dividend arrearages, the
changes imported into the Model Act by the various jurisdictions that have em-
braced it do not appear to have disturbed its basic philosophy.
B. Cumulative Voting
The 1953 revision of the Model Act made cumulative voting for the election
of directors compulsory.40 Among the alternative provisions introduced in the
1955 revision, however, was one making cumulative voting optional.41 The com-
pulsory, provision has not been adopted in any of the states whose new statutes are
patterned after the Model Act, except North Dakota,42 which has a constitutional
:a E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § io(9) (ig5i). "'See Barnhart, supra note 33, at 24.
.:ILL. REv. STAT. c. 32, §§ 157.14, 157.28 (1955).
s See Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U. L. Rv.
I, 12 (1955).
'
0 
MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRATroN AcT § 31.
" Alternative provisions are set forth in CoMrn-mE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AmRICAN BAR AssociAToI,
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Act, REVISIONS AND OPTIONAL SECTIONS (1955).
42 ND. Laws 5957, c. 102, § 30.
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provision requiring cumulative voting. Texas, Virginia, Oregon, and the District of
Columbia provide that the articles of incorporation may permit cumulative voting.4 3
In North Carolina and Ohio, cumulative voting is also permitted, but for it to apply
to a particular election of directors, appropriate notice must be given by the share-
holder desiring it. In originally providing only the compulsory cumulative-voting
provision, the draftsmen of the Act were of the opinion that minority representa-
tion should be preserved under all circumstances; 45 but after further reflection, they
appear to have changed their minds and now offer the alternative provision without
recommendation4 6
In thirteen states, cumulative voting is constitutionally required; it is made manda-
tory by statute in six other states; and twelve states have permissive provisions with
respect thereto 7  In making cumulative voting permissive rather than mandatory,
the recently-adopted statutes have conformed to the majority view of states in which
the matter is not regulated by a constitutional provision.
The compulsory cumulative-voting alternative provision of the Model Act is, to
some extent, modified by section thirty-five, which provides that when a board of
directors consists of nine or more members, it may be divided into two or three
classes, each of which may be elected on a staggered basis, so that only a portion
of the whole board is elected annually. In states which constitutionally require
cumulative voting, a problem will be raised as to whether or not this statutory
provision may be adopted. Thus, in Wolfson v. Averys the court held that the
Illinois statutory provision permitting the classification of directors conflicted with
the constitutional requirement. In other states having this constitutional require-
ment, however, the question is still open, and some corporations there continue to
classify their boards of directors, regardless. Until a decision is rendered in the
matter in these states, such boards of directors will prove to have de facto rather
than de jure status if it is finally determined that such classification is invalid.
The precise wording of the constitutional requirements is not the same in each of
these states, however, and it may be that the courts will distinguish the Wolfson case
and uphold classified boards. It may be significant in this connection that in spite
of its constitutional requirement of cumulative voting for directors,4 9 North Dakota
has adopted the Model Act provision permitting classification of directors, ° its legis-
lature apparently recognizing no conflict.
By limiting the classifications to only two or three and by limiting the power to
,1TE'. Bus. Cony. Acr art. 2.29 D(2) (1956); VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Supp. 1956); Oa. Rv.
STAT. § 57.170(4) (Supp. 1955); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-911 (Supp. 1956).
"N.C. GFN. STAT. § 55-67 (Supp. X955); and Osno Rav. CoDE ANN. § 1701.55 (Page Supp. x956).
"Preface to x95o revision at p. vi, contained in CoMaurrEE oN CoRPoRATE LAws, AMmECAN BAR
Assoc ,roN, MODEL BusiNss COaORa ON Aer (953).
" See Carrington, A Corporation Code for Texas, io Anx. L. REv. 28, 33 (1955).
"See Commissioners' Note following MoDa. BusiNEss ComEoRAnoN Acr oF 1928, 9 U.L.A. 1o8
(195').
' 6 Ill.2d 78, z26 N.E.2d 70, (I955).
A"N.D. CoNsT. § 135.
'o N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 35.
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classify to boards having more than nine members, the Model Act, to some extent,
dampens the effect of classification. But classification, nevertheless, effectively
frustrates, at least partially, the purpose of the cumulative voting requirement. For
instance, if the board of directors consisted of nine and all were elected at one
election, it would take ten per cent of the vote plus one vote to elect one director.
If the board were classified so that only three were elected at a time, however, it
would take twenty-five per cent of the vote plus one to elect one director.5 '
C. Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to Voting
Under section 136 of the Model -Act, which has been adopted by each jurisdic-
tion patterning its act after the Model Act, a greater vote may be required by the
articles of incorporation with respect to particular action than is specified by the
statute for such action. This provision was intended to overrule those cases which
have, in certain instances, cast doubt on the validity of such articles.5 2 It can prove
particularly useful in meeting the needs of closely-held corporations, which may be
regarded as incorporated partnerships.P
Section thirty-two, likewise adopted in each such jurisdiction, authorizes the cre-
ation of voting trusts limited to a ten-year period. A copy of the voting-trust agree-
ment must be deposited with the corporation and must be open to examination by
shareholders and holders of an interest in the voting-trust agreement at all times.
Certain other provisions of the Model Act, fixing the voting status of particular
persons in specified instances and the manner in which voting may be conducted,
have also been adopted by the jurisdictions following the Model Act. 4 These pro-
visions make it clear that treasury shares are not entitled to vote; that voting may be
accomplished by proxy, but proxies are not valid after eleven months, unless otherwise
provided in the proxy; that shares held by the corporation in another corporation
may be voted, specifying the person who may vote them on behalf of the corporation;
and that the pledgor votes pledged shares until they are transferred into the name
of the pledgee. They also cover the voting status of fiduciaries and trustees. Other
provisions relate to notice requirements, record dates, closing the transfer books,
quorum requirements, and taking action by unanimous written consent instead of
voting at meetings. By clarifying procedures and voting status, those provisions
eliminate uncertainties which experience has shown would otherwise exist.
II
PRE-EMPTivE RIGHTS
The Model Act provides that the pre-emptive right of a shareholder to acquire
unissued or treasury shares may be limited or denied to the extent provided in the
'l See Note, 5o Nw. U. L. REv. x12 (1955); CHARLES M. WVILLIAN.S, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR Dx-
RECTORS 48 (951).
"
2 Jones v. St. Louis Structural Steel Company, 267 Ill. App. 576 (x949).
53 See Latty, The Closed Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Act, 34 N.C.L. REv.
432, 444 (1956).
"MoDE.L BUSINESS CoRPoRATIoN Aar §§ 27, 28, 30, 31, 138.
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articles of incorporation. If the articles do not originally so provide, the corpora-
tion, by amendment procedures, including a class vote by the class or classes of shares
having pre-emptive rights, may amend its articles of incorporation to limit, deny,
or grant such pre-emptive rights. 5 Unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, any corporation may sell its shares to its officers or employees or to
officers or employees of any subsidiary, without first offering such shares to its share-
holders, if the terms of the option are approved by the holders of two-thirds of each
class of shares entitled to vote thereon or by its board of directors pursuant to like
approval of shareholders. The Model Act does not define the term "pre-emptive
rights," but leaves it to the common law. It does, however, specify that pre-emptive
rights apply to treasury shares, although this is not true at common law.
These provisions have been adopted almost verbatim in North Dakota,5 Oregon,57
Texas,"' and the District of Columbia 9 The District of Columbia, however, has
deleted the reference to treasury shares. Wisconsin did not adopt the provision for
the limitation of pre-emptive rights in connection with sales of shares to employees
The states of Virginia and North Carolina also have departed in a substantial way
from the Model Act provisions in defining pre-emptive rights and the particular
situations in which they are applicable. The Virginia statute limits these rights to
unissued shares and clarifies their status in certain other contexts. Thus, pre-emptive
rights do not apply to shares issued for services or property or to shares issued to
officers or employees pursuant to a plan approved by the shareholders; the holders
of shares preferred as to dividends and assets are not entitled to pre-emptive rights
for shares of any class; the holders of common stock are not entitled to pre-emptive
rights as to shares preferred and limited as to dividends or assets; and the holders of
nonvoting common stock are not entitled to pre-emptive rights as to common stock.
The articles of incorporation may, however, confer pre-emptive rights where not
provided by the statute. And if a package is offered consisting of common stock
and other securities, it is not contemplated that pre-emptive rights will apply. 1
Under the North Carolina statute, pre-emptive rights apply to treasury shares,
but, as is also the case under the Virginia statute, they are otherwise limited to cir-
cumstances under which they would be available at common lawY2 The North
Carolina provision relating to pre-emptive rights was based on the comparable Ohio
statute 3 and resembles it particularly in that it provides a definition of pre-emptive
rights and covers pre-emptive rights with respect to convertible securities and options.
5 Id. §§ 24, 53, 55. Alternative provision is set forth in CommnTTEE ON CoRpoRATm LAws, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL BUSINESS CoRuoRAnoN Acr, EvISIONS AND OPTIONAL SEC'IONS (1955).
" N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, SS 23, 54-
r7 ORE. R v. STAT. §§ 57.136, 57-355, 57.365 (Supp. 1955).
5 8 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT arts 2.22, 4.02, 4.03 (956).
" D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 29-908; 2 9 -9 21f, 29-922 (Supp. 1956).0 W's. STAT. §§ 180.21, 180.50 (1955)-
" VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-23 (Supp. 1956), and comment thereon of the Code Commission appointed
to draft the statute.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-56 (Supp. 1955).
0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.15, 17O1.22 (Page Supp. 1956).
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Under the North Carolina and Ohio statutes, it is expressly provided that pre-
emptive rights do not apply to shares issued to satisfy conversion or option rights,
but the issuance of securities convertible into shares or options to purchase shares of
a class which has pre-emptive rights requires approval by a two-thirds vote of that
class, which vote operates as a waiver of its pre-emptive rights.0 4 On the other
hand, under the New York Stock Corporation Law, it is expressly provided that
convertible securities and options are subject to pre-emptive rights and that these
rights may be satisfied by first offering the convertible security or option to stock-
holders.0 5 At common law in some jurisdictions, too, pre-emptive rights apply to
convertible securities60 and may be satisfied by giving existing shareholders having
such rights the right of first refusal with respect thereto prior to their issuance.
Apparently the Model Act leaves the resolution of these matters to the common
law.
During recent years, convertible debentures have become a popular method of
financing. Also, in connection with underwritings, particularly in the case of small
corporations, options have been granted in lieu of cash payment to underwriters.
It would seem, therefore, that to the extent that these new statutes have clarified the
status of pre-emptive rights with respect to convertible securities and stock options,
they have effected a significant improvement.
The North Carolina and Ohio statutes also specifically provide for the waiver of
pre-emptive rights in particular cases by two-thirdg vote. 7 The Model Act, by
expressly referring to waiver in the case of employee stock-option plans, gives rise
to the implication that waiver in other instances by a specified vote is not possible,
unless otherwise authorized by the articles of incorporation. Of course, a procedure
which could be followed under the Model Act would be to amend the articles of
incorporation so as to provide for the limitation of pre-emptive rights in particular
instances by a specified vote of shareholders, and to obtain a vote for limitation with
respect to a particular issue involved.
It is understood that the draftsmen intend to revise the provisions of the Model
Act with respect to pre-emptive rights. In so doing, they may follow the North
Carolina statute in defining what is meant by pre-emptive rights. With respect to
options and convertible securities, they may follow the North Carolina and Ohio
statutory provisions, which deny pre-emptive rights in connection therewith, or the
New York statutory provision, which recognizes these rights and specifies the
means Qf satisfying them.
64 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-44, 55-56 (Supp. X955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 170.15(D) and (E),
x7O1.I6, 1701.22 (Page Supp. x956).
" N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 39.
- See HENRY \W. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONs 491 (1946).
17 N.C. GEr. STAT. § 55-56(C)(6) (Supp. 1955); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 17ox5 (Page Supp.
1956).
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III
PAR VALUE
Under the Model Act, corporations have complete freedom of action in deter-
mining whether shares will have par value or not and if so, how much par value
will be. 3  In addition, by amendment, which requires a class vote, there is com-
plete freedom to increase or decrease par value, or to change from par to no par value,
or vice versaP9 The concept of par value affects the stated capital and capital surplus
of the corporation, both of which are defined terms under the Model Act7 ° Shares
having a par value may not be issued for a lesser consideration, which, to that extent,
becomes stated capital of the corporation; the excess, if any, over par value becomes
capital surplus, which the board of directors is free to transfer wholly or partially to
stated capital, as it wishes. Shares without par value, on the other hand, may be
issued for such consideration as the board of directors may fix, unless the articles of
incorporation reserve this determination to the shareholders. The entire amount
of consideration thus received becomes stated capital. Directors, however, within
sixty days after the issuance of shares without par value, may allocate to capital
surplus not more than twenty-five per cent of the consideration received from their
sale. In the case of shares without par value having a preference in voluntary
liquidation, a further limitation is imposed, in that not more than the excess over
the amount of this preference may be designated as capital surplus71
When payment of the consideration for which shares are to be issued has been
received by the corporation, the shares are deemed to be fully-paid and nonassessable,
and the stockholder has no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect
thereto7 2
Upon the issuance of shares having par value as dividend, a transfer to stated
capital of an amount equal to such par value is required. In the case of a stock divi-
dend of shares without par value, the transfer to stated capital of an amount fixed
by the board of directors is required7  A stock split-up or subdivision, on the other
hand, does not require such transfer to capital. Par value also constitutes a limita-
tion on the extent to which shares without par value may be converted into shares
with par value, as the stated capital of the corporation represented by the shares
without par value is required to be at least equal to the aggregate par value of the
shares into which the shares are to be converted 74
Each of the revised statutes which has been patterned after the Model Act has
followed its structure with respect to provisions governing par, no par, and low par
value shares, the consideration required for their issuance, and the accounting pro-
cedure to be observed'7 5 Under the North Carolina and District of Columbia
° MODEL BUSINESS CORPoRAToN AcT § 14. 6 Id § 53, 55.
1
°Id. § 2(j) and (m). 'Id. §1 17, 19.
"'1d. § 40(d). I31d. §5 :6, 23.
'Id. § 14(e).
"'D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-908, 29-908C, 29-9o8d, 29-90 8e, 29-908f, 29-922 (Supp. 1956); ORE.
Rzv. STAT. 55 57.080, 57-100, 57.106, 57.111, 57.13I, 57-355, 57-365 (Supp. 1955); WIs. STAT. §§ i80.12,
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statutes, however, the board of directors is permitted to allocate to paid-in surplus
more than twenty-five per cent of the consideration received for shares without par
value. The rationale of this departure is that since par value shares may have an
insignificant par value, there is no reason for limiting the proportion of the considera-
tion paid for no par value shares that may be allocated to paid-in surplus. The
North Carolina statute also makes it clear that par value shares are fully-paid, al-
though issued at a discount representing underwriting compensation.P7
A variation from the Model Act in the Virginia statute permits corporations to
sell par value shares for less than par.18 The provision was derived from Virginia's
previous statute, and in line therewith, "stated capital" for par value shares is limited
to the consideration received for their issuance up to par value, unless the directors
dedicate any excess to stated capital.10 Shareholder liability is limited to payment
of the full consideration for which the shares were to be issued, and upon its receipt
by the corporation, the shares are deemed fully-paid and nonassessable, unless there
has been fraud or the stock statement filed with the State Corporation Commission
of Virginia does not properly reflect valuation of any property or of services for
which the stock was issued 80
As will be discussed more fully below, application in the statutes of the defined
terms "stated capital" and "capital surplus," together with the term "earned surplus"
and in some cases other defined terms, affects the corporation's right to make distri-
butions, to pay dividends, and to acquire its own shares. The concept of par value,
through its effect in this connection, is, thus, an important one.
IV
PREFERENCES ON LIQUIDATION AND AS TO DIVIDENDS
Under section fourteen of the Model Act, a corporation, by so providing in its
articles of incorporation, may create shares that entitle their holders to preferences
over other classes in the assets of the corporation upon its voluntary or involuntary
liquidation. This section also permits the establishment of both preferences as to
dividends and the right to cumulative and noncumulative or partially cumulative
dividends. Preferred classes or special classes of shares may be issued in series which
must be identical, except for dividend rates, terms of redemption, amounts payable
on voluntary and involuntary liquidation, sinking-fund provisions, and circumstances
under which convertibility, if any, is authorized8 1 Such terms may be fixed by the
board of directors, if this is so authorized by the articles of incorporation. By amend-
180.14, 18o.5, 18o.i6, 180.50, 18o.52 (1955); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 12, 15, 16, 18, 54, 56;
TFx. Bus. CORP. AcT arts. 2.12, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.21, 4.01, 4.03 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-12,
13.1-17, 13.-I18, 13.1-55 (Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40, 55-46, 55-47, 55-99 (Supp. 1955)-
"'D.C. CODE ANqr. § 29-9o8e (Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-47(b)(2) (Supp. 1955).
77N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-46(c)(2) (Supp. 1955).
78 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-17 (Supp. 1956).
MO1d. § i3.1-A8.
S"Id. § 13.1-22.
'
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ment of the articles of incorporation, a corporation may create new classes of shares
which may be senior or junior to existing classes and may effect reclassifications,
changes, and exchanges of its shares8 2 Where a senior class is created, however,
a class vote is requiredP
The Model Act contains no requirement that dividends be paid. It does, how-
ever, permit payment of preferred dividends in circumstances where payment of other
dividends is not permitted. Dividends, except stock dividends and dividends payable
out of depletion reserves by a wasting-assets corporation, may be paid only out of the
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation! 4  Under section
forty-one, however, which covers distributions in partial liquidation, the board of
directors of the corporation may distribute dividends to the holders of shares having
a cumulative preferential right thereto out of the capital surplus, if the corporation
has no earned surplus and is not insolvent at the time. Whenever such distribution
is made, however, it must be identified as a payment out of capital surplus.
The Model Act protects liquidation preferences by preventing distributions to
and acquisitions of shares which would reduce net assets below the amount of those
preferences. Distributions in partial liquidation are, thus, prohibited where they
would reduce the remaining net assets below the voluntary liquidation preference
of any class of shares8 5 And purchases of other than redeemable shares and pur-
chases in certain other specified circumstances may be made only out of earned
surplus or, if the articles of incorporation so provide or if two-thirds of shareholders
entitled to vote in the matter approve, out of capital surplus; 6 but redeemable
shares may not be redeemed if this would reduce the corporation's net assets below
the aggregate amount that would be payable to the holders of preferred shares upon
involuntary liquidation ! 7  Accordingly, the standard limiting the amounts which
may be disbursed in dividends or distributed to or used for acquisitions of shares
is the preferential amount to which preferred shares are entitled upon liquidation.
The Model Act has been criticized, however, because this criterion permits the deple-
tion of the stated capital of junior shares which would otherwise constitute a cushion
of protection to the preferred shareholders8 8
If the par value of par value shares or the consideration received for no par value
shares equals or exceeds liquidation preferences, the stated capital of junior shares,.
initially at least, affords added protection to the preferred stockholders' liquidation
preference. There are various ways, however, in which this cushion can be deplete(!
by corporate action, without approval of the preferred class. Thus, for example, a.
distribution to common stock in partial liquidation may be made under section
82 Id. § 53. 8 1 Id. § 55.
841d. § 40. "5 Id. § 41(d).
"6 Such other specified circumstances being to eliminate fractions, settle indebtedness to the corpora-
tion, or pay dissenting shareholders. MODEL BUSINESS Cos'oRsAnoN ACr § 5.87 id. § 6o.
" Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HAIRv. L. REv. x357
(1957),
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forty-one, without any vote, if the articles of incorporation so provide, to the full
extent of the stated capital of the common stock in excess of liquidation preferences.
Also, by permitting acquisitions and redemptions of shares, the Model Act allows
the corporation to reduce the security of preference shares by the stated capital of
junior shares. Thus, if permitted by the provisions of the articles of incorporation,
or with a vote of two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote (without any class
vote) if not so permitted, junior shares may be purchased out of capital surplus from
the sales of junior shares or even of the senior shares themselves8 9 Although, until
the shares are canceled, use of the surplus represented by such shares is restricted
with respect to any further purchases of shares, thereafter stated capital is reduced,
and surplus is once again freed for further purchases. This permits the use of
capital surplus as a revolving fund to reduce stated capital by director action alone,
if the articles of incorporation so provide. By permitting the redemption of re-
deemable junior shares 0 out of stated capital or capital surplus, without any share-
holder vote, so long as it does not reduce net assets below preferred share preferences,
the Model Act also permits a reduction of stated capital, which affects the margin
of security afforded to senior preferred shares by the stated capital of junior sharesy'
The statutes patterned after the Model Act have, for the most part, also followed
its structure with respect to provisions relating to authority to create classes of stock
with preferences; 2 and the North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin statutes sub-
stantially follow the Model Act with respect to provisions relating to dividends,
distributions, and acquisitions of shares as they relate to preferred dividends and
the protection of liquidation preferences. 3 The District of Columbia, North Caro-
lina, and Texas statutes, however, have departed from the Model Act with respect
to these latter matters.
Under the North Carolina statute, all preferred shares are entitled to a dividend
credit-the excess of earnings over dividends from the date of issuance-and until
such credit is paid in full, no dividend can be paid on junior sharesy 4 This consti-
tutes a pressure on common stock to pay preferred dividends which does not exist
under the Model Act, unless made a part of the share contract by the articles of
incorporation. Possibly this is a desirable change, but it presupposes that in all cir-
cumstances, preferred holders desire ordinary income in the form of dividends. Un-
der current tax laws, situations are certainly conceivable where this is not the case.
89 MoDE Busu'rass CO0uOarON Acr § 5. Capitat surplus available for this purpose may be created
by reduction of stated capital, either without charter amendment under section sixty-three or by charter
amendment without a class vote (unless par value is affected) under section fifty-three.
" See infra 279-81 for discussion as to creation of redeemable common stocks.
"
1 MoD.L BUSINESS CORPORA TION Ac § 6o.
"
5 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-908, 29-908a (Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. S5 5.5-40, 55-41 (Supp.
1955); N.D. Laws 1957, c. X02, H5 12, 13; ORE. REV. STAT. 5 57.080, 57.085 (Supp. 1955); TEx. Bus.
Cons. Act arts. 2.12, 2.13 (1956); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 12.1-12, 13.1-13, 13.X-14 (Supp. 5956); NVis.
STAT. § 180.12 (1955).
"
5 N.D. LAws 1957, c. 102, §5 5, 40, 41, 63; ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.035, 57.216, 57.221, 57.390
(Supp. 1955); and Wis. REv. STAT. §5 180.38, x80.39, 180.385 (1955).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 55-40(c) (Supp. 1955).
SAR CI-IARACr=ISnCS 277
The North Carolina statute also requires, upon demand of twenty per cent of a
class of shares, payment of one-third of the corporation's net profits in a specified
period as dividends in cash. 5 This provision, in addition to being subject to the
above criticism, by not taking into account the corporation's working capital situation
or the prevalence of covenants in debt instruments restricting dividends, may also
prove to be impracticable from a business point of view.
The Oregon, Texas, District of Columbia, and North Carolina statutes have,
moreover, departed from the Model Act to clarify provisions relating to dividends of
corporations exploiting natural resources0 6 In each of these jurisdictions, this pro-
vision has been changed so as to emphasize that such dividends are payable out of
net profits before deduction of depletion. The Texas statute, in addition, restricts
the payment of dividends by wasting-assets corporations if all cumulative preferred
dividends have not been fully paid or if such dividends, after provision for actual
depletion fairly reflecting the decrease in value of assets from such depletion, would
reduce net assets below preferential rights in voluntary liquidation. These pro-
visions, in effect, make applicable to dividends paid by wasting-assets corporations
the restrictions on distributions in partial liquidaton of the Model Act relating to
full payments in cumulative dividends and preservation of assets sufficient to meet
liquidation preferences. Under the Model Act, this is left to the share contract of
the preferred stock.
The second class of provisions introduced by the new statutes are those which
have increased restrictions on distributions to and acquisitions of shares in order to
protect liquidation preferences.
Under the District of Columbia statute, dividends may be paid out of paid-in or
reduction surplus.Y7 Distributions in partial liquidation may not be made, however,
when net assets are less than stated capital and must be authorized by a two-thirds
class vote. 8 Also, purchases of shares are restricted where they would reduce the
net assets below the sum of stated capital plus surplus other than earned surplus.
Redeemable shares, however, may be purchased at a price not exceeding the redemp-
tion price, if this would not reduce the net assets below the amount which would
be payable on liquidation to holders of shares having a senior or pari passu position
and in the cases referred to in section five of the Model Act. 9
Under the Texas statute, dividends, other than stock dividends and dividends paid
by wasting-assets corporations, may only be paid out of unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus.' 0 Distributions in partial liquidation may be made out of capital
surplus or surplus created by a reduction of capital and must be approved by a
two-thirds vote of each class.' 0 Without such approval, however, dividends may
9,11d. § 55"5o00).
"
8 D.C. CoDE ANN. § 29-917 (Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(d) (Supp. 1955); ORx. REv.
STAT. § 57.216 (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CORP. Aar art. 2.39 (1956).
0 7 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2 9 -9 17(b) (Supp. 1956). 
93 1d. § 29- 9 17a(d).
"Id. § 29-904a. ' 00 TEx. Bus. Coap. AcT art. 2.38 (1956).
101 Id. art. 2.40.
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be paid out of this surplus on shares having a cumulative preferential right thereto." 2
Only shares having a liquidation preference may be redeemable by the corporation,
and if such redemption is for an amount greater than the stated capital of the
shares redeemed, the excess must be paid out of surplus. Purchases of shares out of
unrestricted capital surplus or unrestricted reduction surplus, except in the case of
redeemable shares and in the cases specified in section five of the Model Act, may
be made only upon a two-thirds class vote of all shares of each class103
Under the North Carolina statute, dividends may be paid out of earned surplus
or net profits for the preceding or current accounting period; but on preferred
shares, dividends may be paid out of capital surplus if the corporation has no earned
surplus, although capital surplus paid in by a senior class may not be used to pay
dividends on a junior class.104 Dividends are restricted if they would result in a
reduction of net assets below the aggregate of the highest liquidation preferences of
preferred stocks or if the "dividend credit" of preferred stocks has not been fully
paid. Distributions on partial liquidation are permitted out of capital surplus and
reduction surplus, but only upon a majority class vote. Purchases or redemptions
when capital is impaired may be made only of redeemable shares, at prices not ex-
ceeding the redemption price, or in the cases specified in section five of the Model
Act, or to perform repurchase agreements with employees, or by an open-end in-
vestment company to purchase its shares. Junior shares may not be purchased or
redeemed when a default exists in the payment of accrued dividends or of the
"dividend credit" on any senior shares. Ratable purchases out of surplus may be
made of all holders of a class, without any vote of shareholders, or on an organized
exchange, with the approval of a majority of the holders of the shares of the class
purchased, or from any shareholder, upon vote of a majority of the holders of the
shares of the class purchased and of the classes otherwise entitled to vote.106
The Virginia statute is less stringent as to dividends, distributions, and acquisi-
tions. WithQut a vote of shareholders, dividends may be paid out of capital sur-
plus,106 and purchases and redemptions of shares may be made out of capital
surplus'
The variety of the statutory provisions, intended to protect liquidation prefer-
ences against dividends, distributions, and acquisitions of shares, raises a basic ques-
tion as to what the status of preferred stock should be. Should the statutes merely
restrict dividends, distributions, and acquisitions so that they do not reduce net
assets below liquidation preferences, the standard adopted by the Model Act; or
should preferred stocks be entitled to have the cushion of the stated capital of junior
"I 1d. art. 2.12B(r). 103 1d. art. 2.03.
'N.C. Gasr. STAT. § 55-40 (Supp. 1955). Permitting the payment of dividends out of net profits
for the preceding or current accounting periods, while seemingly liberal, does directly what can be
done indirectly by a reduction of capital. Combining this provision with the "dividend credit" and the
requirement that dividends be paid if twenty per cent of a class so request, see notes 94 and 95, supra,
gives preferred stockholders a strong position under the North Carolina statute.
... Id. § 55-52.
... VA. Cona ANN. § 13.1-43 (Supp. 1956).
07 rd. § 13.1-4.
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stocks and surplus other than earned surplus protected against such dividends, dis-
tributions, and acquisitions? Under prevalent concepts, there is no necessary rela-
tionship between stated capital, capital surplus, and liquidation preferences, so that
it is only in the case where such capital accounts exceed liquidating preferences that
the latter type of protective provisions would be effective. North Carolina, Texas,
and the District of Columbia have sought to protect stated capital and capital sur-
plus by requiring approval by a class vote of shareholders on distributions to and
acquisitions of junior shares from these sources. This type of provision gives to a
holder of preferred stock rights which a creditor does not have, since without any
creditor action, capital can be reduced to the minimum specified in the statutes,
usually $i,ooo, and distributions then can be freely made to stockholders down to
that amount. The position of a holder of preferred stock is more precarious than
that of a creditor. At a definite date, the corporation's obligation to a creditor be-
comes due, at which time he can pursue his remedies. This is not true as to pre-
ferred stocks, although preferred stock provisions usually include a sinking-fund
requirement which produces the same result. Also, preferred stock provisions
normally contain their own limitations on dividends, distributions, and acquisitions
of shares and frequently reserve to holders the right to elect part of the board of
directors when things are not going well' 0 The Model Act type of provision
leaves a wide area for bargaining in fixing the terms of a preferred stock, but at the
same time, it protects the actual amounts to which preferred shareholders are entitled
in liquidation. This type of provision seems preferable to the more clumsy one
which becomes operative only if the capital accounts happen to exceed liquidating
preferences and which may prevent distributions and acquisitions of shares by the
corporation, which would be advantageous to all concerned.
V
REDEMPTION
Section fourteen of the Model Act authorizes the creation of shares redeemable by
the corporation. The terms and conditions governing redemption are among the
matters which the board of directors may determine for a particular series, if so
authorized by the articles of incorporation' 9 By amendment to the articles of in-
corporation, redeemable classes can be authorized."0 A corporation may purchase
its redeemable shares out of earned or capital surplus without a shareholder vote,"'
but redeemable shares may not be purchased if the corporation is insolvent or the
'"o For a preferred stock to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it must provide for the
right to elect at least two directors upon default in six quarterly dividends. NEw YoRa STOCK Ex-
CHANGE, ComPANY MANUAL § A-15 (1956). See also SEC Release No. 131o6, Feb. i6, 1956, requiring
preferred stocks issued by companies subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952), to provide the right to elect a majority of the board if dividends are in
arrears for four quarters; and section 367 of the Regulations issued under the California Corporate
Securities Law, having a similar requirement.
100 MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRATroN .Acr § 15. :1 0 Id. § 53.
111 Id. § 5.
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purchase would reduce its net assets below the amount payable in involuntary liquida-
tion to the holders of shares having prior or equal rights.'12 Redemption cancels
redeemable shares and, unless the articles of incorporation provide that they may
not be reissued, restores them to the status of authorized but unissued shares."3
This automatically reduces stated capital upon the filing of a statement of cancella-
tion with the secretary of state.
The statutes patterned after the Model Act generally follow its provisions relating
to redeemable classes of stock," 4 with the exceptions noted above under the heading
"Preferences on Liquidation and as to Dividends" relating to circumstances under
which redemptions and purchases of redeemable shares may be carried out. Under
the Texas statute, however, only shares having a liquidation preference can be
redeemed." 5 But in other states, the authority to create redeemable shares is not
so limited. This raises the question as to whether or not redeemable common stocks
may be created. In Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co.,". it was held that the
words of the Delaware statute which granted corporations authority to make "pre-
ferred and special classes" of stock redeemable, did not contemplate common stock.
In Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons,"' however, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
construed the similar Massachusetts statute as authorizing the creation of redeemable
common stock. The argument that the creation of redeemable common stock was
against public policy, in that it destroys the independence of stockholders, was met
with the opinion that such redemption could not be exercised oppressively or for
the purpose of discriminating against minority stockholders. Also, the court rejected
the argument that the inherent nature of common stock is such as to be incompatible
with a call provision. While there thus seems to be a division of view as to whether
redeemable common stocks can be created, since common stock is normally intended
to provide the permanent capital of the corporation, there would appear to be little
hardship in Delaware's construction of its statute.
The North Carolina statute provides that the right of redemption must be at
the option of the corporation,"' which is comparable to the California provision."9
Underlying this type of statute is the belief that stockholders should not have the
option to compel redemption of their stock by the corporation at any particular
time. Such an option would, it is argued, constitute a continuing threat to working
capital and the cash position of the corporation, and, as a practical matter, it would
most likely be exercised when the corporation was least able to pay. This theory,
however, does not seem sound. After all, management negotiates the terms of any
'
1 2 Id. § 6o. 121 Id. § 6I.
'D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-908, 29-921f (Supp. x956); ORE. REv. STAT. 9H 57.080, 57.355 (Supp.
'955); Wxs. STAT. §§ 180.12, 180.50 (1955); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, §§ X2, 54; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-13,
13.1-55 (Supp. 1956); TEc. Bus. CoRP. AcT arts. 2.12, 4.01 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40, 55.99
(Supp. 1955).
1 
'TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACr art. 2.12B(i) (x956).
1 2r Del. Ch. 380, 191 At. 887 (Ch.), at'd, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
117 33 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1957).
... N.C. GEE. STAT. § 55-40 (Supp. 1955).
"9 CAL. CoR. CODE § 101I.
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stock, and presumably it is in a position to protect itself against injurious provisions.
There may, in fact, be situations in which it would be advantageous from a tax or
another viewpoint to grant a put to the shareholder. It would, therefore, seem pref-
erable to leave the question of whether preferred stocks may be redeemable at the
option of their holders to negotiation by the parties.
VI
CONVERTIBILITY
Under the Model Act, corporations have the power to create and issue shares
convertible into shares of any other class; but, in order to prevent dilution of senior
classes, shares may not be convertible into shares of a senior class, and the stated
capital represented by no par value shares must be at least equal to the aggregate
par value of shares into which they are convertible. 2° If the articles of incorporation
so provide, the board of directors may fix the terms on which particular series of a
class of shares may be converted.' 2 ' The stated capital of shares issued on conversion
is the stated capital of the shares converted, plus the surplus transferred to stated
capital, and any additional consideration paid to the corporation. 22
For the most part, the new statutes which have been based upon the Model Act
substantially follow its provisions as to convertibility. 23  The District of Columbia
statute, however, does not contain the provision prohibiting convertibility into senior
shares' 24 And the Texas statute makes specific provision for including in the terms
of convertible shares appropriate antidilution provisions for the protection thereof' 25
The North Carolina statute, in addition to covering convertible equity securities,
includes provisions specifically authorizing the creation of debt securities convertible
into capital stock.' 2 Moreover, it provides that a corporation must show on its
balance sheet the current conversion ratio of outstanding convertible securities and
the price at which exercisable and, at all times, must reserve sufficient shares to meet
the conversion rights. If such reservation is not made, the right to claim damages
exists. And as has been pointed out above, the creation of securities convertible into
a class of stock which has pre-emptive rights must be approved by the vote of two-
thirds of the holders of such class.
Convertible securities have been popular in recent years because of their associated
tax advantages. In the case of convertible debt securities, they afford the holder a
fixed income and a creditor status until conversion. If the corporation does well,
a capital gain can be realized either by sale of the debt security or by conversion
into common stock and the sale of the common stock. The corporation gains
2' MODEL BusmNEss Comeox, zoN ACr § 14. 21 id. § 15.
122 Id. § 17.
"
2 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-908, 29-9o8a, 29-908C (Supp. 1956); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, §§ 12, 13,
15; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 57.080, 57.085, 57.100 (Supp. 1955); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-13, 13.1-14,
13.1-19. (Supp. 1956); iVs. STAT. §§ 180.12, 180.I4 (I955); TEX. Bus. Coap. AcT arts. 2.12, 2.13,
2.r5 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40, 55-41, 55-44 (Supp. 1955).
... D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-9o8 (Supp. 1956). "1 TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT art. 2.12 (1956).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (Supp. 1955).
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an advantage, too, in that pending absorption of the capital produced by sale
of the convertible security and the resultant generation of additional earnings, the
corporation can deduct interest as an expense. The rate of interest is lower because
of the conversion feature. Also, during the period prior to the realization of addi-
tional earnings from capital expenditures made with such proceeds, the earnings per
share of common stock do not become diluted. Because of the attractiveness of con-
version, from both the point of view of the investor and the corporation, it is de-
sirable that statutory provisions relating to convertibility be clarified. The North
Carolina statute, by covering these matters, has made a desirable contribution.
CONCLUSION
A good corporate statute should confer maximum flexibility with respect to each
share characteristic. A corporation should be permitted to grant, limit, or deny
voting powers to particular classes, to grant preferences as to dividends and in
liquidation, to make shares redeemable, and to create convertible securities. It
should be enabled to make changes in its capital structure to meet the needs of
growth, acquire assets by merger and consolidation, and reorganize if it becomes
involved in difficulties. Such flexibility should be limited only by reasonable pro-
tective provisions. In order to be effectual, a corporate statute must be competitive
with the statutes of other states. Otherwise, a state defeats its own purpose in
revising its corporate statute, because ambiguity or unusual and impractical provisions
will drive businessmen to incorporate elsewhere. The recent statutes, except possibly
the Texas statute, solely because of its eighty-per-cent-vote requirement for particular
matters, and the North Carolina statute, because of numerous novel provisions, seem
adequately to meet the competition. The Model Act has provided an excellent
starting point in its clarity, internal consistency, and flexibility. It is, indeed, a credit
to its draftsmen that so many jurisdictions have followed it so closely in framing
their new corporation statutes.
